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Effects of the New Bankruptcy Code
On Creditors with Secured Claims In
Residential Real Property
RICHARD MEDNICK*
The sweeping changes brought about by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 may have a profound effect on the secured interests of lenders. The
rights of a creditor against a debtor, and the procedure that he must follow
vary with the chapter of the new Bankruptcy Code under which the debtor
files his claim. Richard Mednick, a Judge on the Bankruptcy Court for the
Central District of California, explains the procedures required and the in-
terest affected by the most commonly invoked chapters of the new code.
Judge Mednick strongly urges that creditors become familiar with these
changes, as some new requirements may become traps for the unwary
lender.
News all too familiar to lenders with security interests in resi-
dential real property is that the borrower has ified a petition in
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is a fact of life with which lenders must
cope.' Therefore, they are well advised to become generally fa-
miliar with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,2
commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, since it may affect
their secured positions. The rights and problems of a secured
creditor may vary depending upon the chapter of the new Bank-
ruptcy Code under which the debtor seeks relief.3 The use of a
* Judge of the Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Doris Schaffer, a member
of The California Bar.
1. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938); Mueller v. Nugent,
184 U.S. 1 (1901).
2. Pub. L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(1)-151326
(1978)).
3. Chapter 7 provides for straight liquidation. Chapter 11 provides for the re-
organization of the debtor through a plan to pay creditors, and even permits a liq-
uidating plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b) (4) (1978). Chapter 13 provides
for the adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income. An involuntary
petition may be filed against a debtor only under Chapters 7 and 11. 11 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1978). (Chapter 9 governs proceedings for municipalities and is not consid-
hypothetical situation will serve to illustrate some provisions of
the new Code with which lenders having secured interests in resi-
dential real property and their counsel should become familiar.
Alfa owns a home. Beta Corporation holds a first deed of trust
on the property in the amount of $80,000. Gamma holds a second
trust deed of $20,000, which is in default. Delta is a judgment
creditor for $5,000.4 The real property has a market value of
$140,000. Gamma has a foreclosure sale set for January 14, 1981 at
noon. In December, 1980, suspecting that Alfa is on the verge of
filing for bankruptcy relief, Gamma discusses with his attorney
how the filing by Alfa of a Chapter 7, 11, or 13 bankruptcy petition
will affect his secured rights.
Upon Alfa's filing of a petition in bankruptcy, an estate is cre-
ated.5 With limited exceptions, as of the commencement of the
case, the estate is comprised of all the legal or equitable interest
of the debtor in any property wherever located.6 When the peti-
tion is filed, Alfa's interest in the home becomes property of the
estate. 7
In a Chapter 7 filing, after the estate is created, a trustee is ap-
pointed to act as the representative of the estate. It is the duty of
the trustee to liquidate the estate for the benefit of the creditors.8
After all the property comes into the estate, the debtor is permit-
ted to exempt certain properly qualified property.9
ered here). The provisions of Chapters 7, 11, and 13 apply only to those Chapters.
It is important to recognize that except where provided otherwise in the Code, the
provisions of Chapters 1, 3, and 5 all apply to Chapters 7, 11, and 13. 11 U.S.C. § 103
(1978).
4. State laws may treat judgment creditors and judgment lien creditors differ-
ently. Under California law, a judgment creditor becomes a judgment lien creditor
by perfection. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 674.7 (West 1980).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1978).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1978).
7. This is a major change under the Code. Under § 70a of the former Bank-
ruptcy Act, exempt property did not pass to the estate. See note 19 infra and ac-
companying text.
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323(a), 701, 704 (1978). To assist the trustee in marshalling as-
sets for the benefit of the unsecured creditors, 11 U.S.C. §§ 545, 547, 548, and 549
give the trustee certain avoiding powers that may affect the rights of secured cred-
itors. The provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 546 limit those powers.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) permits the debtor to elect a set of exemptions pre-
scribed in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (bankruptcy exemptions), or those created by state or
local law and federal law other than § 522(d). The debtor may choose one set or
the other, but not both. A dependent of the debtor may file a schedule of exempt
property on behalf of the debtor if the debtor fails to do so. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1)
(1978). Debtors filing a joint petition may each choose a set of exemptions. 11
U.S.C. § 522(m) (1978). The Code gives the state the option to pass legislation
making the federal bankruptcy exemptions under § 522(d) inapplicable. The
states passing such legislation as of September, 1980, are: Arizona, Florida, Geor-
gia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Virginia and Wyoming.
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To protect the debtor and provide the trustee with the time nec-
essary to evaluate and collect the property of the estate, an auto-
matic stay of foreclosures becomes effective upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition. This stay restrains most creditors from tak-
ing any action to collect their claims.10 The scope of the auto-
matic stay is extremely broad, limiting lien enforcement" and
other actions that would affect or interfere with the property of
the estate. To stop the noon sale on January 14, 1981, Alfa would
have to file his petition with the bankruptcy court no later than
11:59 A.M. on that date. Although it would be ideal if he timely
informed Gamma of the filing, it is not necessary to do so. Even
without notice, any sale after the filing would be in violation of
the automatic stay.12 However, a petition fied after that time
would not void an otherwise proper and timely sale.13 In order for
Gamma to proceed with the foreclosure sale after a petition is
timely ified, he must request the bankruptcy court to grant relief
from the automatic stay.' 4 The stay created by the filing of the
10. 11 U.S.C. § 3629(a) (1978). The filing of a petition does not operate as a
stay in those instances specifled in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) permits liens to pass through the bankruptcy estate un-
affected other than by the automatic stay unless a party in interest requests the
court to determine and allow or disallow, pursuant to § 506(a), the claim secured
by the lien, in which event the lien is void to the extent it is not allowed. H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1977).
12. Even in the absence of formal notice, a lender with actual notice of the
borrower's bankruptcy petition who proceeds with a foreclosure sale may be sub-
ject to contempt of court proceedings. See Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia
Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976). See also note 14 infra.
13. The trustee's sale must otherwise be proper so as to prevent its avoidance
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2), which permits the trustee to avoid any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property that was made within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition if the debtor received less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) defines "trans-
fer". In Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), a debtor's
property was sold at a foreclosure sale nine days prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. The sole bidder at the foreclosure sale bid the exact amount necessary to
liquidate the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust, which was approximately
57.7% of the fair market value of the property on the day of the sale. The court set
aside the sale as fraudulent pursuant to § 67d of the former Bankruptcy Act be-
cause the transfer was not for "fair consideration" within the meaning of the Act.
Section 548 of the Code is largely derived from § 67d of the Act and it would ap-
pear that the same principles may apply.
The effects of a bankruptcy proceeding on mortgages and deeds of trust are es-
sentially the same. In those states recognizing mortgages and/or providing for ju-
dicial foreclosure procedures, there may be a redemption right that passes to the
bankruptcy estate. Once a deed of trust is foreclosed by a trustee's sale, no re-
demption right remains.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1978). The request for relief from the stay should be
petition will terminate with respect to Gamma thirty days after its
request for relief. The court may order the stay continued, pend-
ing a final determination of those factors, discussed below, which
support relief from the stay.15
The Code provides that absent such a request, the stay of an act
against property of the estate continues until it is terminated or
otherwise modified by the court,16 or until such property is no
longer property of the estate.17 Legislative history indicates that
it was the intention of Congress that the stay terminate when the
property ceases to be property of the estate because of sale, aban-
donment, or exemption; but that it not terminate if the property
leaves the estate and simply passes to the debtor.18 This would
be the case if Alfa were to perfect his homestead interest in the
property prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and the
trustee, having no objection to the claim of homestead exemp-
tion,' 9 were to find no remaining value to the estate. The auto-
made in the district in which the debtor's petition has been filed. Jurisdiction and
venue under the Code are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1471. In In re Coleman Ameri-
can Companies, Inc., 7 B.C.D. 127 (D. Kan. 1981), although the debtor's petition
had been filed in the Bankruptcy Court in Kansas, the secured creditor requested
relief from the Bankruptcy Court in Colorado. The Kansas court held that such
action was a violation of the automatic stay subject to punishment for contempt.
But see In re Coleman American Companies, Inc., 6 B.R. 251 (D. Colo. 1980) in
which the Colorado court held that it had jurisdiction.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (1978) provides:
Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief
from the stay of any act against property of the estate under subsection
(a) of this section, such stay is terminated with respect to the party in in-
terest making such request, unless the court, after notice and a hearing,
orders such stay continued in effect pending, or as a result of, a final hear-
ing and determination under subsection (d) of this section. A hearing
under this subsection may be a preliminary hearing, or may be consoli-
dated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section. If the
hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing-
(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the
final hearing under subsection (d) of this section; and
(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days after such
preliminary hearing.
Id. (emphasis added).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 362(e) (1978).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (1) (1978).
18. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 52 (1978).
19. The bankruptcy exemptions allow a debtor to claim exempt up to $7,500 in
real or personal property that is the residence of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1) (1978). The debtor may also claim exempt $400 in
any property (which could result in an additional exemption in the debtor's home-
stead). 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (5) (1978). The amount of homestead exemption varies
under state laws. California, considered one of the most liberal states in this re-
gard, currently provides for a homestead exemption of $45,000. CAL. Cirv. CODE
§ 1260 (West 1980).
As of the commencement of a bankruptcy case, the Code gives the trustee the
rights of a judicial lien creditor, a creditor holding an execution return unsatisfied,
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matic stay of an act against the debtor or his property that is
created by the filing of the petition continues until the case is
closed or dismissed and the debtor's discharge has been granted
or denied.20 However, the discharge itself operates as a perma-
nent injunction against the collection of the debt. If secured cred-
itors wish to foreclose after the debtor's discharge, they still may
have to seek relief in the bankruptcy court.21
and a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)
(1978). The trustee's rights vis-a.vis his various positions are defined by the juris-
diction governing the property in question. Commercial Credit Co., Inc. v. David-
son, 112 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1940). For example, in California, where a debtor elects
the state exemptions and has previously recorded a declaration of homestead, the
trustee takes the position of a judgment lien creditor whose lien does not attach to
the debtor's homestead. Engelman v. Gordon, 82 Cal. App. 3d 174, 146 Cal. Rptr.
835 (1978). This reduces his status to that of a general unsecured creditor whose
obligation is dischargeable. Where a declaration of homestead has not been re-
corded, but the debtor claims the benefits of California's "automatic" homestead
provision, CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 690.31 (West 1980), the result is different. Since
no declaration of homestead has been recorded, the trustee is in the position of a
judgment lien creditor whose lien (in the amount of the claims validly due the un-
secured creditors), attaches to the residential property subject to prior recorded
liens 'and the debtor's exemption. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.31, 674(c) (West
1980). For a more comprehensive discussion of the trustee's rights as a judicial
lien creditor, see In re Carole Jean Martin, 6 B.R. 827 (C.D. Cal. 1980). But cf. In re
Campbell, 5 B.C.D. 6 (S.D. Cal. 1978) (where no homestead declaration had been
recorded at the date of the petition, California Code of Civil Procedure § 690.31
protected debtor's possession only, and title to the property passed to the trustee
under § 70a of the Act). In connection with Campbell, see note 7 supra and accom-
panying text.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2) (1978).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2) (1978). It has been suggested that secured creditors
should attempt to have the debtor reaffirm the debt prior to discharge in accord-
ance with 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) or request relief from the court prior to discharge to
avoid the effects of the permanent injunction created upon discharge by 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(a) (2). Where the loan is not in default prior to discharge, there is a question
as to whether cause exists for the bankruptcy court to lift the stay. Can a secured
creditor proceed with foreclosure absent default? In light of 11 U.S.C. § 506(d),
note 11 supra, and § 524(c) (4), it is not clear that reaffirmation of a debt secured
by real property is necessary unless one seeks a deficiency. See In re Coots, 6
B.C.D. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1980). The Coots court suggests that the debtor's personal
liability is dischargeable while the secured creditor retains its lien. See also
Mapoether, Bankruptcy Strategies for Representing Creditors in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 Cases, 86 Comm. L.J. 133 (1981), where the author suggests that interac-
tion of sections 524(a) (2) and 506(d) prohibits an unsecured creditor from collect-
ing a debt by proceeding against the unencumbered property of the debtor, but
that the right of the secured creditor to enforce its lien against the specific prop-
erty in which it has a security interest is unaffected. But see In re Williams, 7
B.C.D. 388 (D. Kan. 1981) where the bankruptcy court held that a creditor may not
enforce any pre-filing liens against debtors of their property after discharge absent
an enforceable reaffirmation agreement.
Section 362(d) of the New Bankruptcy Code sets forth the
grounds for relief from the automatic stay:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this
section, such as by termination, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such
stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest
in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if-
(A) The debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization
(emphasis added),.=
The Code does not define "adequate protection." However, it
does propose three non-exclusive methods of providing adequate
protection to a creditor with a security interest in the property of
the debtor. Section 361(1) suggests that periodic cash payments
to the creditor may provide adequate protection to the extent that
the automatic stay results in a decrease in the value of the secur-
ity.23 Section 361(2)24 proposes an additional or replacement lien
as a form of adequate protection to the extent that the stay re-
sults in a decrease in the value of the secured creditor's interests.
Section 361(3)25 gives the court the flexibility to formulate ade-
quate protection on a case by case basis by providing such relief
as will result in the realization by the creditor of the indubitable
equivalent of his interest in the property.26
If the debtor desires to continue the stay, it is his duty to pro-
pose to the secured creditor a method of providing adequate pro-
22. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1978).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1978) reads as follows:
When adequate protection is required under Section 362, 363 or 364 of this
title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may
be provided by
(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to such en-
tity, to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale,
or lease under section 363 of this title, or any grant of a len under sec-
tion 364 of this title results in a decrease in the value of such entity's
interest in such property...
Id. This concept is derived from In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971)
where the secured creditor was adequately protected by payments sufficient to
preserve the status quo with respect to the value of the creditor's interest in the
property. See also In re Yale Express System, Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967); In
re El Patio, Ltd., 6 B.C.D. 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
. 24. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (1978) reads as follows: "(2) providing to such entity an
additional or replacement lien to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or
grant results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property
25. 11 U.S.C. § 36i(3) reads as follows: "(3) granting such other relief, other
than entitling such entity to compensation allowable under section 503(b) (1) of
this title as an administrative expense, as will result in the realization by such en-
tity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such property."
26. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338 (1977); In re Paradise Boat
Leasing Corp., 5 B.R. 822 (D.C. V.I. 1980).
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tection.27 Methods vary, limited only by the ingenuity of the
debtor and his attorney. Some bankruptcy courts have held that
an equity cushion can itself constitute adequate protection.28 In
such cases, it is necessary to determine the amount of the debt
owed and the value of the property in order to establish whether
an equity cushion exists. In the hypothetical case presented here,
the house is valued at $140,000, and the recorded encumbrances
total $100,000. It would appear that Gamma is protected by an eq-
uity cushion of $40,000, Beta Corporation, the first trust deed
holder, is protected by an equity cushion of $60,00029 and Delta,
the judgment creditor, is protected by an equity cushion of
$35,000, if its interest is secured.30 The burden of showing that
Alfa lacks equity in the property is on the creditor requesting re-
lief from the stay, and the burden of proof on all other issues is on
the party opposing such relief,31 usually the trustee and/or the
debtor. Absent other factors which cause the lack of adequate
protection, such as delinquent taxes, poor property maintenance,
and insufficient insurance, Gamma appears to be over-secured
and would not be able to have the stay lifted until its equity is
eroded.32
With the filing of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Alfa be-
comes a debtor in possession.33 The purpose of a Chapter 11 peti-
27. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2) (1978). See also In re Lake Tahoe Land Co., Inc., 5
B.R. 34 (D. Nev. 1980); In re Moore, 5 B.R. 449 (D. Md. 1980); In re Princess Baking
Corp., 5 B.R. 587 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re San Clemente Estates, 5 B.R. 605 (S.D. Cal.
1980); In re Bradley, 3 B.R. 313 (E.D. Va. 1980).
28. In re Castle Ranch of Ramona, Inc., 5 B.C.D. 1386 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re
Rogers Development Corp., 5 B.C.D. 1392 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Pitts, 2 B.R. 476
(C.D. Cal. 1979). Cf. In re Lake Tahoe Land Co., Inc. 5 B.R. 34 (D. Nev. 1980) (ade-
quate protection for a commercial lender is an equity cushion of 40-50% of market
value).
29. In the hypothetical situation presented here, Alfa has not defaulted on the
first trust deed to Beta Corporation. However, in the event of default, the rights
and burdens of the parties are essentially the same as discussed herein with re-
spect to the holder of the second trust deed.
30. The rights and burdens of the judgment creditor under the Code are es-
sentially the same as discussed herein with respect to the holder of the second
trust deed. But cf. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1). See also note 4 supra. The rights of judg-
ment creditors to perfect and execute on their liens are governed by varying state
laws.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2) (1978).
32. The Code allows a creditor whose claim is over-secured to recover interest
and any reasonable fees, costs, and charges provided for in the security agree-
ment. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1978).
33. The rights and duties of a debtor in possession are specified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1107 and are substantially similar to those of a trustee.
tion is to provide a distressed debtor with time to formulate a
plan to reorganize his affairs and pay his creditors. Ordinarily, a
debtor in such a reorganization is a business; however, there is
nothing in the Code that precludes an individual from seeking
Chapter 11 relief. 34
If, prior to the time the debtor formulates a plan of reorganiza-
tion, Gamma seeks relief from the stay, he still has the burden of
showing that Alfa has no equity in his home. But, if, no equity ex-
ists, an additional element will be present. In addition to the duty
of proposing a method to adequately protect the secured credi-
tor's interest, Alfa may have the burden of proving that his home
is necessary to an effective reorganization. 35
In the hypothetical facts, the $40,000 equity cushion protecting
Gamma may not be sufficient to allow the stay to remain in effect
for the period of a reorganization, particularly if it can be shown
that accruing taxes, interest, and fees are rapidly diminishing the
cushion.36 In addition, the court must ascertain the reasonable
value of the property and whether it will decrease during the pen-
dency of the stay.37 Whether the secured creditor can be ade-
quately protected for the period of the stay and how the
protection is to be provided is a matter to be determined on a
case by case basis, applying equitable principles where appropri-
ate.38 Where adequate protection is requested and allowed, but
subsequently turns out to be inadequate, a priority is granted to
the creditor upon distribution of the estate.39
The Code gives a reorganizing debtor the right to alter the
rights of secured creditors in a plan of reorganization, even over
the objection of that class of creditors. 40 For example, Alfa could
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(d), 101(30) (1978).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(2)(B), 362(g)(2) (1978). In In re Sulzer, 2 B.R. 630
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), the bankruptcy court found that the debtor had no equity in his
home and it was not necessary to his reorganization. The debtor was a psychia-
trist who saw patients in his home as well as in his city office. The court found
that in order for the property to be necessary to an effective reorganization, it
must be used directly in connection with the debtor's business. The fact that the
debtor also used his residence as a place of business was not sufficient, since in
order for the debtor to continue to operate, he could make use of any office space,
and the use of his home was not essential.
36. See In re Castle Ranch of Ramona, Inc., 5 B.C.D. 1386 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
37. See In re El Patio Ltd., 6 B.C.D. 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1980). In In re American
Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 B.C.D. 715, 722 (D. Me. 1976), the court stated that "the most
commercially reasonable disposition practicable in the circumstances should be
the standard [of value] universally applicable in all cases and at every phase of
each case."
38. See note 26 supra and accompany text. See also 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1978); 28
U.S.C. § 1481 (1978); In re El Patio, Ltd., 6 B.C.D. 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1978).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1978).
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propose that the secured creditors receive the full amount of their
secured claims including interest 41 upon the sale of his home at a
price of no less than $165,000. His plan could further provide that
he has one year from the date of confirmation within which to
consummate the sale, during which time the regular monthly pay-
ments will be made. While confirmation of a plan requires the
consent of all classes of creditors impaired42 under the plan,43 the
debtor may "cram down" his plan without their acceptance by a
showing that the treatment of the secured creditors is fair and eq-
uitable and does not discriminate. 44
Chapter 13 relief4 5 is available only on a voluntary basis and
only to individuals with regular income who owe, on the date the
petition is filed, less than $100,000 in unsecured debts, and less
than $300,000 in secured debts.46 Like Chapter 11, Chapter 13 is
designed to allow the debtor an opportunity to formulate a plan
for the payment of his creditors. The issues and burdens in a re-
quest to lift the stay are essentially the same as previously
discussed.47
Although a Chapter 13 plan may modify the rights of a secured
creditor when certain criteria are met,48 it may not alter the rights
of a creditor who holds a security interest only on the debtor's
principal residence. 49 However, Alfa's plan could deal with such a
41. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1978).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1978) defines impairment.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8) (1978).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1978). For a comprehensive discussion of the stan-
dards under § 1129(b) that will permit "cram down," see Klee, All You Ever
Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 122 (1979).
45. The purpose of this article is to familiarize readers in a general way with
the provisions of Chapter 13 that may apply to affect the rights of creditors with
secured claims in residential property; it is not intended to be an in-depth study of
that, or any other, Chapter.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1978).
47. Chapter 13 provides for the adjustment of debts of an individual with regu-
lar income. It would appear that the nature of a Chapter 13 proceeding places the
burden on the debtor to show under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2) that his home is neces-
sary to an effective reorganization. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. But
see In re Feimster, 6 B.C.D. 131 (N.D. Ga. 1979) in which the bankruptcy court held
that the question of reorganization is only applicable to Chapter 11 cases since the
term "reorganization" is absent from the provisions of Chapter 13. Contra, In re
McAloon, 1 B.R. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The proposed Technical Amendments Bill to
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides for the applicability of § 362(d) (2) in
Chapter 13 cases.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1978).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1978).
creditor by providing that installment payments to cure the de-
fault,50 as well as the current contract payments, be made through
the Chapter 13 trustee.51
Creditors holding secured claims should be aware that a bank-
ruptcy procedure rule52 requires that secured creditors file a
proof of claim before the first meeting of creditors in a Chapter 13
case. Untimely claims are not treated as secured claims for pur-
poses of distribution. The new Bankruptcy Code makes the
Bankruptcy Rules in existence at the time of its passage applica-
ble to cases fied under the Code to the extent they are not incon-
sistent with the Code.53 Since it is usually unnecessary for
secured creditors to file proofs of claim in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
proceedings,54 this Chapter 13 requirement could be a trap for the
unwary. At least one bankruptcy court has held that the Bank-
ruptcy Rule is not inconsistent with the new Chapter 13, and a se-
cured creditor who fails to file a timely claim can retain its lien,
but must participate pro rata with unsecured creditors and may
not be paid in a preferential manner.55
"The best defense is a good offense." That old cliche is sound
advice to lenders with secured claims in residential property
whose rights may be adjudicated in a bankruptcy court. A gen-
eral familiarity with those provisions of the Bankruptcy Code af-
fecting their interests will permit swift resort to their rights and
remedies.
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